Werner Falk (Thesis)

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Werner Falk (Thesis)

			Werner Falk’s Thesis: Translations and comments

			Original Thesis Documents from the University of Heidelberg

			Admission documents relating to the winter term 1929-30 at the University of Heidelberg

			2 Feb 1930 Form filled out by Werner Falk

			Werner Falk’s Studies in the University of Heidelberg - Winter Semester 1929

			6 Dec 1929 Typed request by Werner Falk for an accelerated promotion after only one term (Winter 1929/30) at the University of Heidelberg

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			page 2

			2 Nov 1929 Letter from Prof Sombart to Prof Lederer (the ultimate examiner) explaining why Sombart does not wish to examine the thesis.

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			page 2

			28 Jan 1930 Application for admission by Werner Falk

			29 Jan 1930 Official application for admission to the exam.

			Dean Gundolf begs Lederer to give his opinion about the manuscript

			Lederer’s opinion on the thesis

			Original in German page 1

			Original in German page 2

			Translation into English and typed transliterated German text

			Examiner’s comment on thesis by Werner David Falk. English Translation (by Dr Adalbert Saurma) This work has a prehistory. The author studied with Mr. Sombart in Berlin, out of whose advanced course his investigation grew up. The author is in a most detailed way concerned with Sombart’s methodological position, which he rejects. Therefore Mr. Sombart would not submit this work to his faculty and asked me to take over this actually very interesting thesis since otherwise he would be obliged to start a very extensive discussion of it. In order to enable the talented candidate to bring his studies to an end, I complied with this request, however not without mentioning the prehistory because in today’s stage of our theoretical development, I wouldn’t dare to encourage anybody to invest so much trouble, wit and energy in a purely methodological question, which places the problem of value judgement again into the center. On the basis of the Menger -Schmoller controversy this deals with the corresponding question of theory and history. However this brings an unnecessary complication along. The problem of value judgement is treated from a phenomenological position, in particular Heidegger, as the work on the whole raises the problem of methods in our science entirely from philosophical bases. Whether thereby the problem of values can be overcome - as it seems the author aims at - is doubtful to me, because even if the economic flow would be completely surveyable and inevitable, the task of a scientific economic policy remains nevertheless to supply judgemental bases about whether and which means are sufficient in order to realize certain goals, but about the acknowledgement of these an agreement could never be reached, given even the largest and strictest inevitableness - otherwise one would have to take an altogether different position and suppose that the sheer existential context would render these goals compelling. - This work has to be appreciated as a capital achievement, seizing the problem of methods in its deepest anchorage and also being aware to keep in touch with developments of the economic system. Beyond that it’s based to some extent on an exact theoretical knowledge - more exact than generally could be expected among methodologists. In consideration of the scientific level I don’t hesitate to recommend acceptance of this work with the note I, although it would be desirable that this talented author should soon turn to different problems. I. E. Lederer [Translator’s comment: “with the note I” in the German examination system is top of a six point scale and corresponds to a recommended award of First Class Honour – Summa Cum Laude.] German Original Text Gutachten Diese Arbeit hat ihre Vorgeschichte. Der Verfasser hat bei Herrn Sombart in Berlin studiert, in dessen Seminar seine Untersuchung entstand. Der Verfasser befasst sich in ausfuehrlichster Weise mit Sombarts methodologischer Position, die er ablehnt. Herr Sombart hat deshalb diese Arbeit seiner Fakultaet nicht vorlegen wollen und mich ersucht, die an sich sehr interessante Dissertation zu uebernehmen, da er genoetigt waere, sich damit in umfangreichsten Eroerterungen auseinanderzusetzen. Um dem begabten Kandidaten die Beendigung seiner Studien zu ermoeglichen, trage ich diesem Wunsch Rechnung, erwaehne aber die Vorgeschichte, da ich selbst niemand ermutigt haette, im heutigen Stadium der Entwicklung unserer Theorie so viel Muehe, Witz und Energie einer rein methodologischen Fragestellung zu widmen, welche das Werturteilsproblem wieder in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Dies wird, ausgehend von der Kontroverse Menger - Schmoller, mit der Frage: Theorie - Geschichte verbunden, behandelt. Darin liegt aber eine ueberfluessige Komplikation. Das Werturteilsproblem selbst wird von der phaenomenologischen Position her, insbesondere Heidegger behandelt, wie die Arbeit ueberhaupt das Methodenproblem unserer Wissenschaft ganz aus philosophischen Grundlagen aufwirft. Ob damit die Problematik von Werten ueberwunden werden kann - wie es der Verfasser anzustreben scheint - ist mir zweifelhaft, denn selbst wenn man voellige Uebersehbarkeit und Zwangslaeufigkeit desWirtschaftsprozesses annimmt, so bleibt dennoch Aufgabe der wissenschaftlichen Wirtschaftspolitik, Urteilsgrundlagen dafuer zu liefern, ob und welche Mittel ausreichen, um bestimmte Ziele zu realisieren, ueber deren Anerkennung auch die groesste und strengste Zwangslaeufigkeit noch nicht entscheiden kann - es muesste denn sein, man begibt sich auf eine ganz andere Position, von der aus die Zielsetzungen selbst sich aus dem Seinszusammenhang aufdraengen. - Die Arbeit ist als grosse Leistung anzuerkennen, erfasst das Methodenproblem in seiner tiefsten Verankerung, ist sich auch der Verknuepfung mit der Entwicklung des Wirtschaftssystems bewusst, und beruht ausserdem auf einigermassen genauer Kenntnis von Theorie selbst - einer genaueren als man bei Methodologen gemeinhin erwarten kann. Wegen des wissenschaftlichen Niveaus zoegere ich nicht, die Arbeit mit der Note I zur Annahme zu empfehlen, wenngleich zu wuenschen waere, dass sich der begabte Autor bald anderen Problemen zuwenden moege.  I. E. Lederer

			28 Jan 1930 Certification signed by Werner Falk that he personally wrote the thesis

			Official typed Curriculum Vitae signed by Werner Falk

			25 Feb 1930 Results of oral examination and final result, signed: Gundolf and faculty

			20 May 1932 Official Diploma, printed (the name was in red ink)

			26 May 1932 Official schedule added to the manuscript of the the thesis

			Thesis Translation of Table of Contents

			The Value Judgement. Questioning the Logical Foundations of Economic Science. Inaugurate dissertation to obtain a doctor’s degree of the Philosophical Faculty of the Ruprecht Karl University at Heidelberg, submitted by Werner Falk, Berlin Content Introduction: Quarreling again about value judgements? Part I Fundamentals of a ‘systematic political economy’ [Nationaloekonomie] 1. The ‘turn’ of the problem of value judgements among ‘teleological’ theorists Stammler [Rudolf Stammler, 1856-1938] - Stolzmann [Rudolf Stolzmann, 1852-1930] - Wunderlich [Frieda Wunderlich, 1884-1965] 2. The ‘two’ political economics’ [Nationaloekonomien] The state of the problem of [locating] the subject - Economical being as meaningful behaviour - The essential basis of the quarrel about ‘historical’ and ‘theoretical’ political economies [Nationaloekonomien] 3. The idea of supply covering all requirements: Matter and meaning of the original economical problem The problem of how societal economical behaviour is - The content of the original economical problem - The meaning of economical behaviour helps to justify the ‘right’ questions 4. The idea of supply covering all requirements as a standarised basis for the empirical establishment of the facts and of criticism: The critical-understanding approach Economical experience and judgements about ‘existential appropriateness’ - Explaining actions as according to plan and the problem of regularity - Theory and practice Part II Capitalism’s societal solution of the problem of covering all requirements as a matter of ’systematic’ political economy [Nationaloekonomie] 1. The naturalistic-unsystematic [not according to a plan] solution in high capitalism The societal unity of economics - ‘Not intented’ socioeconomic management - The structure of societal-economical consciousness 2. Suitability and limitations of the generalizing method in high capitalism The naturalistic way of being and a generalizing methodology - Limitations of a general solution of the ‘problem of welfare’ - The economical reality is not mature enough for an enlarged ‘knowledge of itself’ 3. Mutation of the structure of the socioeconomical consciousness in late capitalism The application of the notion ‘late capitalism’ - The procedure of activating the consciousness - Starting a societal-conscious confrontation of the two sides in economics 4. Implementation of a naturalistic management in economics along with the problem of how to proceed according to plan Inclusion of the real facts - Generalizing and ‘critical understanding’ methodology in late capitalism - The position of science in late capitalism [Adalbert Saurma]

			Last Sentence of thesis

			Werner Falk was firing with heavy philosophical artillery at Sombart's position (remember that 'spirit's science' - a word by word translation of german 'Geistes-Wissenschaft' - written in one word: Geisteswissenschaft - is the usual designation for the humanities in the german speaking countries). I looked at the thesis last sentence (going over 7 lines and there's no full stop at the end ..!) where Werner says something like: the special theoretical-practical duty of the 'systematic political economy' in late capitalism is to make evident (by his favored understanding-critical approach) the different possibilities of the solutions emerging from the confrontation of the ways to define what societally is really needed ('Bedarf'), which in turn depends from the political circumstancies ... Between the lines one might read his private solution is pointing toward some planification of the economy - and in the late twenties this meant either Stalin or Mussolini (who, compared to Hitler, seemed to be a more personal and even rational dictator, commanding a kind of socialism as the best solution for the moment. That's why some intellectual jews fled in 1933, after being cut off of their future in Germany, to yet not racist Italy, with some sympathy for a strong hand ...). From my translations you can imagine the difficulties flowering out of the german speciality of creating long words (just for fun: 'Donaudampfschifffahrts- gesellschaftshauptgebaeude' - the main building of the company of the steamships on the Danube) combined with Husserl/Heidegger terminology (worst case: 'das Seinsrichtige' = 'the beingrightness'). [Adalbert Saurma]

			Note of Werner Falk’s curriculum vitae, attached to thesis

			In Werner Falk’s thesis copy - the ‘official’ one in the university library - there’s an insert pasted between p.178 and 179, with a short, unpersonal telegram styled 14 line curriculum vitae (’Lebenslauf’ as title): ‘Werner Falk, born on April 25 1906 as the son of the practical doctor (medical practitioner) Dr. Fritz Falk in Berlin-Charlottenburg. School was humanistic gymnasium, Abitur examination in March 1924 at the Bismarck- Joachim- Friedrich- Gymnasium in Berlin-Wilmersdorf. Apprenticeship as a salesman (’kaufmaennische Lehre’) from April 1924 to October 1925, afterwards until February 1930 studies in economics (’Nationaloekonomie’), philosophy and societal science (’Gesellschaftslehre’. Lessons and exercises with professors Sombart, Bortkievicz, Lederer, Bernhard, Hirsch, Vierkandt and others. In 1928 and 1929 besides the studies a specialist (’Facharbeiter’) at the Reichs-Board for efficiency (’Reichskuratorium fuer Wirtschaftlichkeit’), commission specialised in industrial budgetting (’Fachausschuss fuer industrielles Budget’).’ [*Expat]

			Some further notes on the thesis

			Comment on the topic of the thesis

			It seems that Werner started writing the thesis with a absolutely exact idea which was to prove that there was only one logical way to arrive at a somehow natural form of ‘good’ economics, and this natural form was rather Marxist and almost purposely from the beginning against the somehow soft-big-bourgeois theories of Professor Sombart (who was slipping slowly in the late twenties to a more right-wing position. Regretably it appears that Professor Sombart, as Werner’s Berliner ‘Doktorvater’ (a quite normal term for the supervisor, meaning ‘father’ of the ‘doctor’ (-examination)), experienced this work in part as rivalry undermining his own work, and would not take it forward to the Professorial Board. Werner was thus forced to go elsewhere to Professor Lederer to have the thesis examined. [*Expat]

			Possible relationship to Wall street crash

			The difference between the examination in 1930 and the official promotion in 1932 comes from the date of the publication (1932) of the thesis. Before the (accepted) publication one is only ‘Dr. des.’ (Doctor designatus), meaning the academic authorities will allow you to call yourself a real ‘Dr.’ only after the publication (to be financed by the candidate! I think Werner Falk mentioned the ‘Black Friday’, October 25-28 1929?).

			There is thus a possible relationship to the Wall street crash (with the crowd looking up to the windows hoping some suddenly poor millinaire would jump). The idea came because Werner Falk (or Sombart) mentioned some urgent economic circumstances which were the reason for his hurying up with the examination (and which might have also been the reason for the delay in printing the thesis - or perhaps this was due to his sense of perfection in ‘flattening’ Sombart, so he had to ad some new, even more convincing arguments. But then this would have meant - if everything had to be done correctly - to get a new ‘imprimatur’ by Lederer or even the whole faculty). [*Expat]

			Various stages of the thesis

			Esslinger who wrote about Lederer

			Contemporary Thesis Abstracts which refer to Werner Falk’s Thesis

			Motivational internalism and the authority of morality by Mahon, James Edwin, Ph.D., Duke University, 2000, 257 pages; AAT 9978291 Abstract

			If it is true that an agent who has a moral reason for acting has a reason for acting independently of whether or not she has a desire to so act (Moral Reasons Authoritativeness), then it cannot also be true both that moral reasons are necessarily motivating (Motivational Internalism about Moral Reasons) and that an agent who is motivated to act is motivated in virtue of a desire to so act (Desire Motivationalism). This dissertation argues that the arguments given against Motivational Internalism about Moral Reasons are stronger than the arguments given against either Moral Reasons Authoritativeness or Desire Motivationalism. Chapter 1 outlines two types of motivational internalism: Motivational Internalism about Moral Judgments (MIMJ), and Motivational Internalism about Moral Reasons (MIMR). It also outlines six other sub-positions on the nature of moral reasons, moral judgments and moral obligations, and on the nature of the connection between desires and motivation. Two of these sub-positions are Moral Reasons Authoritativeness (MRA) and Desire Motivationalism (DM). Chapter 2 argues that deontological intuitionists, such as H. A. Prichard, rejected MIMR in order to defend both MRA and DM. Here I defend Prichard’s motivational externalist account of moral motivation, in terms of a desire to do one’s duty, from a selection of criticisms. Chapter 3 argues that W. D. Falk, who coined the terms “internalism” and “externalism”, rejected DM in order to defend both MIMR and MRA. Here I argue that Falk’s motivational internalist account of moral motivation, in terms of an impulse to act that is not a desire and that has a sui generis sense of necessity attached to it, fails. Since Falk has not refuted DM, he cannot successfully defend MRA. Chapter 4 argues that moral noncognitivists, such as A. J. Ayer, rejected MRA in order to defend both MIMR and DM. Here I argue that Ayer’s account of moral reasons, according to which some fact about a situation is moral reason for acting if and only if awareness of this fact evokes a moral feeling in an agent, fails. Since Ayer has not refuted MRA, he cannot successfully defend MIMR.

			Personal morality and choice internalism by Kracher, Beverly, Ph.D., The University of Nebraska - Lincoln, 1991, 253 pages; AAT 9129559 Abstract

			Moral internalism is the position that motivation is necessary for an individual to have a moral obligation or for an individual’s making a moral judgment. Moral externalism is the position that there are no such necessary connections. In this dissertation I show that the internalisms proposed by W. D. Falk, the father of contemporary internalism, and Gilbert Harman, the main proponent of social internalism, are unacceptable, but that there is a form of internalism that can be adequately defended once that portion of an individual’s morality it is taken to explain is precisely specified. Towards these ends, I first distinguish two forms of internalism, namely, pure internalism, the position that does not incorporate in some way, on the metaphysical or psychological level, an externalism; and hybrid internalism, the position that does in some way incorporate externalism. I argue that Falk’s theory, a form of pure internalism, fails to answer an important interpretation of the “Why be moral?” question, and is not a successful explanation of all of an individual’s mature morality. I argue that while Harman’s theory, a form of hybrid internalism, does successfully account for an individual’s social morality (the morality an individual applies to herself and to others), it is ill-suited as an account of an individual’s personal morality (the morality applied by an individual to that individual alone). I then propose that an individual’s personal morality is properly explained by a version of pure internalism which I call Choice Internalism. I defend Choice Internalism against the objection that internalism, in general, cannot properly distinguish real moral change from mere change in an individual’s moral beliefs. Furthermore, I show how Choice Internalism satisfactorily answers important interpretations of the “Why be moral?” question, and how it holds the promise of being combinable with Harman’s hybrid internalism to better account for an individual’s social morality.

			Internalism--the basis of ethical theory by Bartkowiak, Julia Joan, Ph.D., The University of Rochester, 1990, 264 pages; AAT 9111482 Abstract

			UTILITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALITY by CONLY, SARAH O’BRIEN, Ph.D., Cornell University, 1982, 168 pages; AAT 8219395 Abstract

			Critics have argued that utilitarians, by the very nature of the system they endorse, cannot maintain their integrity; and that they cannot, in the end, be individuals of the sort human beings want to be. In my dissertation I explore this criticism and argue that utilitarianism need not endanger integrity, that it need not undercut autonomy, and that it need not deny individuality of any sort. Bernard Williams is the major proponent of this criticism. Williams argues that a utilitarian cannot maintain the commitment to projects and principles which is necessary for a person to be an individual. He cannot have what Williams calls “ground projects,” projects which are so central to him that they are what give point to his life. The reasons Williams gives for this are varied, and the connections between his various criticisms are not always clear. In the thesis I first analyze the arguments Williams uses against utilitarianism. I show that Williams’ arguments that a utilitarian cannot have ground projects depends on a false assumption about the emotional attachment required for a person to be committed to his projects in a way that individuates. I argue that Williams demands an emotional attachment that blinds one to rational consideration, in a way that we will find unacceptable. Williams offers an account of individuality which claims that utilitarianism does not allow the proper sort of emotional attachment to projects because it is too necessarily rational a system. W. D. Falk, on the contrary, offers a theory which if correct will show utilitarianism to be an insufficiently rational system. Falk argues that any moral system which declares that there are universal moral rules by which all people’s behavior should be regulated undercuts the autonomy of the agents to whom it dictates. If one is to be autonomous, one must do only what one has reason to do. An agent has reason to do something only if he would be motivated to do it upon reflection. If utilitarianism does not motivate some particular agent, that agent, in order to preserve rationality and autonomy, ought not to follow utilitarianism. In response to these criticisms I suggest a more plausible notion of individuality which requires neither irrational emotional attachment nor Falk’s subjective standard of rational choice. I then advocate a modified form of utilitarianism which does not pose the dangers to individuality which traditional forms of utilitarianism may. In this version, we broaden the notion of utility so that our evaluative beliefs are of special importance in our determination of what things have utility. When utility-maximization is construed in this way it does not pose special dangers for individuality.